In his recent book, Race, Intelligence and Education,b H. J. Eysenck has written: 'I would be prepared to assert that experts (real experts, that is) would agree with at least 90 per cent of what I am going to say-probably the true figure would be a good deal higher, but there is no point in exaggerating' (p. 15). The major thesis which his book sought to establish was that 'all the evidence to date suggests the strong and indeed overwhelming importance of genetic factors in producing the great variety of intellectual differences which we observe in our culture, and much of the difference observed between certain racial groups ' (p. 130). This latter assertion is demonstrably false, as will become apparent, since 'all the evidence to date' does not speak with one voice. The thesis contains two latent propositions: (a) that intellectual differences among people in our culture are overwhelmingly determined by genetic factors, and (b) that the 15-point mean I.Q. gap between black and white Americans is largely determined by genetic factors. This paper centres on the second proposition, which (as will be demonstrated) is logically and empirically independent of the first, although the vital distinction has recently been blurred by A. R. Jensen (1969)C and subsequently by Eysenck in the quotation above, and throughout his book, which draws heavily on Jensen's controversial paper.
only three American psychologists in the mid-1960s, out of about 21,000 members of the American Psychological Association, who were prepared to conclude in print that genetic factors are implicated in the mean I.Q. difference between the races. His own conclusion (and he is a 'real expert' according to Eysenck's criteria if ever there was one), was that the evidence 'strongly favors a non-genetic interpretation of the typically lower intelligence test score averages of Negro groups ' (pp. 104-5) . We are forced to conclude either that 'expert' consensus has silently undergone a massive and almost unanimous about-turn in less than a decade, surely the most bloodless revolution in the history of science, or that the genetic hypothesis concerning race and intelligence does not command the general support of the 'experts' which its proponents sometimes claim.
One of the more persuasive arguments which has been advanced in support of the genetic hypothesis is what I propose to call, for the sake of convenience, the 'a priori' argument. I shall examine the 'a priori' argument, and several other of what seem to be the most important geneticist arguments, showing why I believe them all to be specious and invalid. I shall then outline briefly what I believe to be the ideological character of the geneticist doctrine.
11
The 'a priori' argument has appeared in various places and in various forms, but the most scientific-sounding version appeared in Jensen's paper, which Eysenck quoted approvingly:
... the myth of racial equality, while more acceptable in principle to any liberal and well-meaning person than its opposite, is still a myth: there is no scientific evidence to support it. Indeed, as Jensen has pointed out, the a priori probability of such a belief is small: Nearly every anatomical, physiological, and biological system investigated shows racial differences. Why should the brain be an exception? (p. 20) .
It must be admitted at once that this argument has a convincing ring about it. Those who would argue against a genetic interpretation of race differences seem to be defeated before they have fired their first shot, and their point of view rendered suspect even before the evidence has been examined. It is of some importance, therefore, to point out that the empirical premise of the argument is false. After an authoritative review of the numerous published studies on certain alleged differences between the brains of black and white Americans, Tobias (1970) concluded that 'there is no acceptable evidence for such structural differences in the brains of these two racial groups; and certainly nothing which provides a satisfactory anatomical basis for explaining any difference in IQ or in other mental or performance tests, in temperament or in behaviour ' (p.22) .
If differences were established between the brains of black and white Americans, what would be the implications of such a finding? It is now known that measurable differences can be produced in the brains of experimental animals by rearing them in enriched or impoverished environments. Environmental manipulations which have reliably produced such structural differences in the brains of various animals have included not only nutrition, but also the perceptual and social environments of equally well-fed animals (Tobias, 1970) . Reported differences between the brains of people of different races, even if valid, would therefore lend no weight to the genetic hypothesis. Nor, for that matter, would they necessarily imply corresponding differences in LQ. The fact that the great French writer, Anatole France, possessed a brain only about three-quarters the average size, while normal people exist with brain sizes three times that of other human beings (Tobias, 1970) is not of great significance to the student of intelligent behaviour. To assume tacitly a one-to-one relationship between physical properties of people's brains and their LQ.s is, as most philosophers of science know, to appeal to the dubious doctrine of reductionism. The 'a priori' argument therefore turns out to be illogical on two counts, in addition to being based on an empirically unsubstantiated premise.
It may still be objected that if LQ. is significantly determined by hereditary factors (a proposition, it will be remembered, which this paper does not seek to examine), then there must be some hitherto undiscovered biochemical basis to I.Q. differences between people. From a genetic point of view, however, there is no reason to expect any consistent racial differences, as Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza (1970) have pointed out: 'As geneticists we can state with certainty that there is no a priori reason why genes affecting IQ, which differ in the gene pools of blacks and whites, should be such that on the average whites have significantly more genes increasing IQ than blacks do' (p. 28). In fact, as these authors go on to explain, there are good reasons for assuming that whites have no such genetic advantage.
Before moving on to something completely different, I want to draw attention to certain facts which apparently lend plausibility to an a priori hypothesis in the opposite direction. These facts strongly suggest the a priori improbability of genetically-determined intellectual differences between the races. The best way of introducing this argument is by relating Mayr's (1968) apocryphal yarn about an American newspaperman visiting Haiti, who managed to get an interview with the President. They began to chat about Haiti and its population, and most indiscreetly the American newspaperman asked the President what percentage of the people was white. 'Oh, about 95 per cent,' replied the President. The American newspaperman scratched his head and said, 'You don't say! How do you define white?' to which the President replied, 'How do you define coloured?' The American said, 'Well, of course, "coloured" means having Negro blood', and the President replied, 'Ah, yes. That's exactly our definition too: "white" means having white blood. ' The purpose of the story is to draw attention to the fact that the definition of 'the Negro race' in the United States is a social and not a genetic definition, and a fairly arbitrary one at that. Anyone with a known black ancestry is classified as 'Negro' in the United States, while in LatinAmerica anyone who is not black is white. In South Africa, by comparison, anyone of recognized mixed descent is classified as 'coloured', and is socially and even legally distinguished from both blacks and whites.
There are several interesting speculations about why the white American ruling class arbitrarily chose such an inclusive social definition of the Negro 'race' in the misty past of its cultural history (Myrdal, 1944) . My own favourite among these is Edwin Embree's (1931) , in his book, Brown America. Embree suggested that 'this custom grew up during slavery in order to increase the number of slaves, who constituted valuable property' (p. 31). Whatever the reason, one result is a weakening of the a priori likelihood of the genetic hypothesis. This would be true even if the slaves had all been drawn from the same gene pool (and therefore constituted a relatively homogeneous genetic group) from the start, which of course they were not. That both these facts, the arbitrary social definition of the Negro 'race' and the genetically mixed make-up of the blacks who were originally imported into the United States, suggest an a priori hypothesis in contradiction to the genetic hypothesis, is explained by Roger Brown (1965): The Mricans who were brought to North America as slaves originated 'from areas as far apart as West Africa, Angola, and Madagascar, . .. and represented as great a biological range as that found in Europe' (Pettigrew, 1964) . Mter three centuries of miscegenation with whites, 75 per cent of American Negroes have at least one white forbear, and some 15 per cent have a predominantly white ancestry (Herskovits, 1930; Stern, 1954) . These facts make it unlikely that American Negroes have any very sharply distinctive inborn psychological characteristics (p. 184) .
And this account makes no mention of the very large proportion of American blacks who have known Indian ancestry, usually estimated at about 27 per cent (Myrdal, 1944) .
While two relatively homogeneous and biologically defined groups might reasonably be expected to show consistent and clearly-differentiated genetic properties, the same cannot be said of two heterogeneous groups which are defined by arbitrarily chosen social criteria. One would not, to take an extreme example, expect such an arbitrary socially defined group as all people whose names begin with P, Q, and R, to be genetically different, on average, from the rest of human-kind, and, to a large extent, the same may be said of the Negro 'race'. The 'a priori' argument seems to have boomeranged, since, on a priori grounds, the hypothesis that there are no very distinct genetic intellectual differences between black and white Americans seems more reasonable than its opposite. Any firm conclusion based on a priori reasoning is, however, illusory.
ill If the matter is to be treated scientifically, then a priori hypotheses (in either direction) are not sufficient; the question is empirical and the evidence has to be examined. It is widely felt, however, that in principle the genetic hypothesis cannot be tested scientifically, since, by the nature of things, unambiguous evidence cannot be obtained. If this were true, then the genetic hypothesis would amount to nothing more than a metaphysical belief. I do not consider this to be the case any more than I believe with Eysenck that, of necessity, 'the evidence is circumstantial' (p. 30), which amounts to much the same thing.
In view of the mixed make-up of the black population of the United States, an extremely powerful direct test of the genetic hypothesis can be made by comparing the I.Q. scores of black people with their known percentage of white ancestry, which can often be established with a fair degree of accuracy by examining genealogies. In his book Eysenck cited a study of Australian aborigines along these lines, the results of which, while they do allow a genetic interpretation, are wholly irrelevant to the interpretation of racial differences in America; but he omitted to mention any of the intra-group studies done in the United States itself. These studies have revealed, to the embarrassment of the genetic hypothesis, that the I.Q. scores of blacks bear no relation whatever to percentage of white ancestry. One carefully controlled study by Witty and Jenkins (1935) for example, revealed that those black children with the highest I.Q.s among 8,000 enrolled in the Chicago public school system possessed a distribution of racial admixtures which was remarkably similar to that found in the black population as a whole (see Table 1 ). Note : Based on data provided by Witty and lenkins (1935) .
&No white ancestry bMore Negro ancestry than white ·Approximately equal white and Negro ancestry dMore white ancestry than Negro
Although not of any statistical relevance, it is worth adding that the brightest child of all, a black schoolgirl with an I.Q. of 200, had no known white ancestry whatever. The statistical findings, however, which are in line with the results of several other studies relating percentage of white ancestry to I.Q. scores among American blacks (cf. Pettigrew, 1964) , constitute a most convincing refutation of the genetic hypothesis. According to scientific criteria, much more weight should be attached to these studies than to the 'circumstantial evidence' discussed by Jensen and Eysenck, which, as will be shown, is open to diverse interpretations.
IV
One of the most popular of the recent geneticist arguments is the argument from compensatory education, which has been given a powerful shot in the arm by Jensen and Eysenck. The opening sentence of Jensen's article reads : 'Compensatory education has been tried and apparently it has failed' (p. 2). This laconic verdict on compensatory education indirectly lends credibility to the genetic hypothesis since intelligence must be determined either by genetic or environmental factors or by both. If massive environmental intervention in the form of compensatory education has failed significantly to raise the low I.Q. scores of underprivileged black children, then, by elimination, we are left with genetic factors to account for most of the between-race variance. The conclusion that genetic factors are largely to blame for the low I.Q. scores of blacks hangs on a long chain of implicit assumptions concerning the nature of intelligence and its relationship to I.Q., the relevance of within-group differences to the interpretation of between-group differences, the probable consequences of being treated as a backward child by a schoolteacher, and the nature and timing of the crucial features of the environmental handicap suffered by underprivileged black children.
RACE
It follows ~:iat any conclusions based on the alleged failure of compensatory education must be treated with proper circumspection; even if the premise is true, it constitutes highly circumstantial evidence for the genetic hypothesis.
My own view is that the argument is irrelevant even if it is true, because accumulating evidence shows that certain crucial determining effects in intellectual development occur very early, and certainly earlier than the ages at which children have been exposed to the celebrated compensatory campaigns like Head Start. Philip Vernon (1970) , whom Eysenck has described as 'probably the foremost expert in the assessment of intelligence in different races and groups ' (p. 19) , made this point, and added that apart from coming too late, Head Start was also too brief: six to eight weeks, or even a year for only a few hours a day, is trifling if the rest of the time is spent in an environment which counteracts any beneficial effects. Of even greater interest is the fact that Vernon went on to challenge the validity of the fundamental premise on which the argument from compensatory education rests, and mentioned certain more intensive campaigns which do, in his estimable judgement, seem to have succeeded.
The most impressive study in my opinion (because it is unquestionably the most true-to-life, although it is only indirectly relevant to the American experience) concerns the Israeli Kibbutzim (Bloom, 1969) . Under homerearing conditions in Israel, Jews of European origin have a mean LQ. of 105, while mid-eastern Jews average 85 I.Q. points (the same as the mean score of American blacks). Under Kibbutz rearing, however, the mean score for both these groups rises to 115 I.Q. points by four years of age, and remains more-or-Iess stable thereafter. Kibbutz rearing differs from compensatory education campaigns like Head Start in at least two important respects: the child spends very nearly the whole of almost every day being exposed to its beneficial effects, and the entire family is typically involved.
One of the more successful American studies is the continuing Milwaukee project of Rick Heber described in Eysenck's book (pp. 113-5). The teachers in this project are very carefully selected and exposed to an elaborate eight-month training programme. Their extremely disadvantaged pupils are given intensive teaching, on a one-teacher-to-one-child basis, from birth, and their mothers are also given special education. The mean I.Q. of an experimental group of children involved in the project has been raised no fewer than 33 points above that of a comparable control group not given any special treatment, a most impressive finding which Eysenck omitted to mention. The oldest children on the project are now five years old, and there are no signs of the initial gains evaporating, despite Eysenck's fears to the contrary. Heber has, in fact, recently commented: '1 am willing to say that it is difficult to conceive of the children in the experimental program ever falling back to the level of their age peers in the lagging control group' (quoted in Strickland, 1971 ).
Heber's project is not an isolated success story; many other studies have produced dramatic LQ. gains when the compensatory intervention has been started early and has been intensive (several of these studies have been reviewed by Goldschmid, 1970) . When appraised of the fact that he had ignored these studies, Jensen modified his position and stated in a letter to the New York Times Magazine (16 November 1969) and in an interview with V.S. News and World Report (2 June 1969) that compensatory education had not always failed . Why, then, did he assert that it had? He told another interviewer for the Ne w York Times Magazine (3 August 1969) , that, as a child, he had always been urged by his English teachers to begin his essays with a provocative opening sentence. Jensen's dainty pirouette contrasts sharply with Eysenck's angry foot-stamping: 'These programmes are political playthings; they have no scientific basis, have no recognisable or lasting effects on those exposed to them, and can only do a disservice to those truly eager to advance the status of the Negro race' (p. 133). The suggestion that we would actually be doing black children a favour by cancelling compensatory education campaigns without further ado, is enough to make even the most devious of minds boggle.
The fact that some well-publicized campaigns like Head Start (often called 'Late Start' by its critics) have been less than successful, is of little relevance to the genetic hypothesis, because, as has been shown, some of the crucial effects seem to occur in very young infants. To complete the picture, it is necessary to mention the surprisingly potent intrauterine effects which have been discovered by painstaking research.
A well-controlled experiment in South Africa, using rats as subjects and published over a decade ago (Cowley and Griesel, 1959) , revealed that the offspring of mothers raised on a protein-deficient diet displayed markedly impaired intellectual development, even if they were given a normal diet after weaning. On the basis of these results, it is, of course impossible to decide whether the crucial effects occurred pre-or postnatally. A further experiment was therefore run, in which the rats born to protein-deficient mothers were transferred at birth to normally well-fed foster mothers and the offspring of normal mothers were transferred at birth to protein-deficient mothers (see Reader, 1963) . Under these conditions, impaired intellectual development was once again demonstrated, thus establishing that the effects are both pre-natal and post-natal, and that the intrauterine environment certainly plays a significant part in mental development. This finding has been strongly borne out in the case of humans by the work ofPasamanick and his co-workers (Pasamanick and Knobloch, 1958; Knobloch, Rider, Harper, and Pasamanick, 1959; Knobloch and Pasamanick, 1962; Pasamanick, 1971) . These research workers have established a strong relationship between socio-economic status, race, and a variety of pregnancy and birth problems, some of which are undoubtedly associated with the inferior diets which are common in black ghettos. To mention one important set of findings, there is a 50 per cent greater risk of premature births among blacks than among whites, and premature infants, when tested years later, score lower on intelligence tests than full-term infants. As a result, black infants score, on the average, lower than whites on intelligence tests, but this gap (as measured by the relatively insensitive infant scales) vanishes when only full-term black and white infants are compared. In view of the fact that protein and vitamin deficiency, as well as other harmful effects during pregnancy and birth, result in many cases in irreversible damage to the central nervous system of the foetus or the newborn infant (Pasamanick, 1971) , it is reasonable to assume that a significant proportion of the I.Q. difference between the races is due to these organic causes. v The recognition that the uterus is also an environment, and one significantly implicated in subsequent intellectual development, provides a compelling alternative to genetic interpretations of twin studies. It is simply not true, although it has often been asserted, that any statistically significant likeness between identical twins reared after birth in different environments must be exclusively due to their known genetic similarity. This invalid assumption, nevertheless, forms the mainstay of an important contemporary geneticist argument, namely the 'heritability' argument. In this context, 'heritability' is a statistical concept which refers to the amount of variance in I.Q. scores which is due to genetic factors. It does not refer to the amount of LQ. which is due to genetic factors, whatever that may mean, although that misinterpretation is often made.
In his influential enunciation of the heritability argument, Jensen wrote : 'I applied [the] heritability formula to all the correlations for monozygotic and dizygotic (half their genes in common) twins reported in the literature and found an average heritability of ·80 for intelligence test scores' (p. 51). Eysenck quoted this result, and added with confidence: 'I can only report that among experts the conclusion I mentioned above is pretty universally accepted, and we may provisionally use it to build up our first argument' (p. 117).
In order to illustrate one fallacy in the heritability calculation, consider the most crucial case of identical (i.e. monozygotic) twins reared apart. The impressively high median correlation which has been found in the hundred or so such twins for which figures are available (cf. Deutsch, 1969, p. 549) , goes into the formula as if it were entirely due to genetic similarity. By the time they are born, however, twins have already shared the same environment for a crucial nine months, and since this environment may be related to subsequent intellectual development, the heritability calculation must be biased upward to an unknown degree; it is even possible that the correlation between the LQ. scores of identical twins reared apart, although it is assigned to purely genetic causes in the formula, is entirely due to environmental similarities between conception and adoption. Mutatis mutandis, the same objection can be raised against calculations based upon the LQ. scores of people of different degrees of consanguinity. The relatively low correlations reported for unrelated foster children raised in the same environment after birth, for example, may be due, at least in part, to differences in their environments before adoption; estimates of variance due to environment based on these figures are therefore biased downwards to an unknown degree. The direct evidence (see Section III above) does not, in any event, support the genetic interpretation.
A more serious matter concerns the misuse and misinterpretation of the concept of heritability by Jensen and Eysenck respectively. Jensen, first of all, misused the concept by linking it with the failure of compensatory education: he implied that, since heritability is high for intelligence, there is little room left for improvement by environmental means such as compensatory education, discussed above in Section IV. Hirsch (I 970) pointed out that this error is incorporated into the quizzical title of Jensen's paper ('How much can we boost IQ ... ?'), the answer to which occurs on p. 59 of his paper, where he asserts that the high heritability of I.Q. ensures that it is relatively unmodifiable by environmental means.
Hirsch, who is an authority on behaviour genetics, politely pointed out that high or low heritability tells us absolutely nothing about how a given individual might have developed under conditions different from those in which he or she actually did develop.
Eysenck, for his part, made the elementary error of using the term 'heritability', which is a statistical concept, as if it applied to individuals; 80 per cent heritability was misinterpreted to mean that 80 per cent of an average individual's LQ. is determined genetically. This error is egregious since it lends plausibility to his anti-compensatory education views, which are, as has been explained in Section IV, not in reality relevant to the heritability issue. It is, in fact, pointless to ask what proportion of an average individual's I.Q. is genetically determined; it is like asking whether the length of an average field or its breadth contributes more to its area. Heritability is a property not of individual I.Q. scores, but of a whole population of scores: it is an estimate of the amount of variance in those scores which is due to genetic differences. In a population of 1, the variance is, by definition, zero. d
This issue is so important that, at the risk of seeming didactic, I am going to spell it out in detail by extending the field analogy. Imagine a set of fields, all of the same length, but of varying breadths. If someone were to enquire to what extent the variance in area was due to differences in length and breadth respectively, the correct answer would be: 100 per cent of the variance in area is due to differences in breadth. It would be nonsensical, however, to interpret this answer as implying that the area of an average field was completely determined by its breadth, and had nothing to do with its length.
In an exactly analogous fashion, heritability refers to variance, in this case variance in I.Q. which is due to genetic factors, and it is equally nonsensical to apply it to individuals. Eysenck repeatedly made this very error, but one priceless howler should suffice: 'The figure of 80 per cent heritability is an average; it does not apply equally to every person in the country. For some people environment may play a much bigger part than is suggested by this figure; for others it may be even less .... An average is an average is an average' (p. 71).
The most powerful rebuttal of the heritability argument centres on the logical point that (even if the 80 per cent estimate is accepted) heritability is irrelevant to the genetic hypothesis concerning racial differences in I.Q. scores. Let me extend the field analogy one step further. Consider now two sets of fields. In one set, the lengths are all the same at 100 feet, but the breadths vary by a few feet. In the other set, all the lengths are 500 feet, and again the widths vary slightly. Within each of these two populations, considered on its own, the variance in area is determined completely by differences in breadth. Nevetheless, the difference between the average areas of the two populations is mostly due to the length difference. By analogy, even if all the variance in I.Q. scores, within each of two given d The following should not be confused: (a) an individual score from a larger population (for which variance is a meaningless concept); (b) a population N = I (for which variance is zero by definition); and (c) a population N < 1 (an unbiased estimate of whose variance is given by the variance of sample n). Kenneth Hughes has pointed out to me that 'in a sense Eysenck was rather modest to say that 80 per cent of a person's LQ. is determined by his genes. He could have said 200 per cent is, since after all i££ x 0= O! But then the nonsense would have been obvious.' The point is that Eysenck failed to distinguish between (a) and Cb), or to realize that only (c) is really applicable. populations, were due to genetic factors (lOO per cent heritability), the average difference between the two populations might be entirely due to environmental factors. Within-group differences tell us absolutely nothing about between-group differences, and consequently heritability is strictly irrelevant to the genetic hypothesis concerning between-group differences. Eysenck therefore committed another fundamental error when he asserted: The argument is simply that this discovery of strong genetic involvement in the determination of individual differences in IQ between members of a given population is an essential precondition for going on to argue in favour of the genetic determination (in part at least) of racial differences in IQ. For clearly if all the within-race differences could be accounted for in environmental terms, we would have no business to look further than that in our search for between-race differences. Thus the discovery of within-race genetic factors determining IQ differences is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for accepting the genetic argument as applied to between-race differences (p. 117). The correct interpretation has been succinctly stated by the geneticists, Bodmer and Cavalli-Sforza (1970) : 'Whether or not the variation in IQ within either race is entirely genetic or entirely environmental has no bearing on the question of the relative contribution of genetic factors and environmental factors to the differences between the races' (p. 27).
VI
I must deal now with two versions of the 'culture-fairness' argument. The weak version of this argument arises from the findings, in Jensen's words, that, ... so-called 'culture-free' or 'culture-fair' tests tend to give Negroes slightly lower scores, on the average, than more conventional IQ tests such as the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler scales. Also, as a group, Negroes perform somewhat more poorly on those subtests which tap abstract abilities. The majority of studies show that Negroes perform relatively better on verbal than on non-verbal intelligence tests (p. 81) . If the low average scores of blacks are due to cultural handicaps, it is held, they should perform comparatively well on relatively culture-fair tests; surely an environmentalist would expect the racial difference to be most pronounced on relatively culture-bound tests?
This argument loses a lot of its impetus when it is pointed out that culturefairness is not a scientific concept at all: it has not been operationalized, and the culture-fairness of a test cannot be measured. The assumption, superficially quite reasonable but devoid of proof, that verbal items are more culture-bound than non-verbal items, forms the crux of the argument. For all we know, however, the reverse may be true. Numerical and geometric puzzles may be strange to a child reared in a black ghetto, while comparatively well-off white children may be more familiar with them through commerce with educational toys and through other features of their enriched environments. The argument cannot be evaluated on account of lack of evidence.
The strong variant of the culture-fairness argument arises from comparisons between the performances of Mexican Americans, Amerindians, Californian Orientals, and blacks.
Mexican Americans, first of all, score consistently higher than blacks on culture-fair tests, while on culture-bound tests their scores fall below those of blacks. Eysenck interpreted these findings as an indirect corroboration of the genetic hypothesis, since they are consistent with the assumptions that Mexican Americans are merely culturally deprived (hence their poor performance, relative to blacks, on culture-bound tests) while blacks are genetically inferior (hence their poor performance, relative to Mexican Americans, on culture-fair tests). A rather more commonsense interpretation of the results on culture-bound tests rests on the fact that such tests are relatively heavily loaded on verbal material. Negroes are, of course, English-speaking, but Mexican Americans, for the most part, are not: their first language, in most cases, is Spanish. Without invoking any genetic speculations, it would be most odd, to say the least, if blacks did not outperform Mexican Americans on verbally-loaded culture-bound tests. The results of culture-fair tests, which also require explanation, can be convincingly accounted for by a number of non-genetic factors which can be most fruitfully discussed with reference to American Indians.
American Indians are, on average, socio-economically worse-off than blacks, but they reportedly score consistently higher than blacks on conventional I.Q. tests. Presumably, if socio-economic factors were allimportant, their environmental deprivation would be reflected in even lower I.Q. scores than those of blacks. According to Jensen and Eysenck, the fact that they actually outperform blacks is consistent with the hypothesis that blacks are genetically inferior, and Eysenck recklessly asserts that 'environmentalist theory does not provide an answer' (p. 120). I shall now grasp Eysenck's nettle by suggesting five answers which 'environmentalist theory' provides.
The first answer centres on the representativeness or otherwise of the Indian samples on which the evidence is based. As Bodmer and CavalliSforza (1970) have pointed out, the samples which have been drawn in urban centres have not been reprentative of the 70 to 80 per cent of Indians who live on reservations. This sampling bias has undoubtedly resulted in misleadingly high scores.
The second answer concerns the fact that the Coleman report on Equality of Educational Opportunity (Coleman et aI., 1966) , on which Jensen and Eysenck based their factual evidence concerning the I.Q. scores of Indians, also revealed that, unlike blacks, American Indians typically go to white schools. Blacks have, in the past, gone to predominantly black schools, and the relatively inferior quality of black schools is universally acknowledged, and well documented in the Coleman report.
The third answer is that racism itself must surely be an important factor. Despite their inferior socio-economic status, Indians are not discriminated against to the same extent as blacks, at least as far as social distance is concerned. This has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies (e.g. Williams, 1965) . It is not surprising, since they are, unlike blacks, outside the mainstream of American society. Those few who have survived the attempted genocide by the white frontiersmen are not now regarded as a threat in the way that blacks are.
The fourth answer involves the concept of cultural continuity, and is relevant also to the interpretation of the relatively high I.Q. scores obtained by Orientals in California. Here is what the social anthropologist Margaret Mead (1968) has to say on this rather subtle question:
The anti-integrationists cite the greater success of immigrants from selfconsciously high cultures-the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Jews-who in spite 148 RACE of prejudice have demonstrated as high and often higher achievement levels than older Americans .... Even the American Indians after four centuries of contact can relate back to the locale of their historical past and preserve a certain degree of ethnic identity (p. 175).
Such identity has been denied to blacks, ever since their culture was ruptured and they were forced to integrate into white American society as slaves.
The fifth and final answer involves the acknowledged practice of 'passing' among blacks. More will be said about 'passing' in Section VII below; at this stage I shall simply point out that the relatively impressive I.Q. scores of Mexican Americans, Indians, and Orientals, may be due in part to the fact that their ranks are continually being swelled by highly intelligent ex-blacks, passing for Mexican, Indian, and Oriental.
Why do Mexican Americans score on average better than blacks on relatively culture-fair I.Q. tests? And why do Indians and Orientals also provide such relatively impressive scores? In view of the fact that these scores do not bear any simple linear relationship to socio-economic status, Jensen and Eysenck have concluded that, with respect to I.Q. blacks are genetically inferior to these other minority groups, thus indirectly lending credibility to the hypothesis that they are genetically inferior to the white majority too. I have focused attention primarily on American Indians, but most of the above arguments are equally applicable to Mexicans and Orientals. As far as American Indians in particular are concerned, the reader must decide whether Eysenck's charge, that 'environmentalist theory does not provide an answer' is fair and accurate.
VII
The phenomenon of 'passing' has, in my opinion, received far too little attention, and a few words are called for concerning its wider implications. These remarks will be, of necessity, largely speculative, since sociologists have not provided many hard facts to go on.
Proponents of the genetic hypothesis have repeatedly pointed out that, in most intellectually superior or gifted samples, blacks seem to be underrepresented. It is at least possible-and some might think rather likelythat it is precisely the most intelligent and ambitious blacks who are most inclined to be creamed off at each generation, as they join the brain drain, so to speak, into more afHuent and rewarding white society. Intelligent blacks, in any event, are more likely to succeed in passing for white, because prejudiced whites tend to consider intelligence a defining characteristic of the white race. The pseudo-logic runs: 'All niggers are stupid; this fellow is not stupid; therefore this fellow is not a nigger', and the intelligent black man or woman has succeeded in 'passing', where the unintelligent might be caught out.
lt is impossible to estimate the extent to which 'passing' takes place, because there is a conspiracy to conceal the fact in families which have first-hand knowledge of it. It may, however, be far more common than is usually realized. Myrdal (1944) reported evidence that it is not only whitelooking Negroes who can succeed at 'passing'. Darker ones, if they are clever enough, can sometimes pass for Indian, Mexican, Oriental, or Philpino. In any event, even Negroes who have more than 50 per cent Negro ancestry can sometimes pass for white, because their original African stock might have been light-skinned.
If these conjectures are valid, then the practice of 'passing' must result in somewhat depressed LQ. scores in the black remainder, and spuriously inflated scores in samples ofIndians, Mexicans, and Orientals. Its relevance to this discussion resides in the fact that it suggests an alternative nongenetic explanation for some key findings. The explanation is speculative, but so is the genetic explanation.
It is surprising that no attention has been devoted to the phenomenon of 'passing' by proponents of the genetic hypothesis. It certainly suggests a more convincing account of the alleged gene-pool differences than the highly implausible one-generation factors mentioned by Eysenck, since 'passing' could be viewed as a continuous selective process. Whether the genetic hypothesis is correct or not, however (and I have sought in this paper to demonstrate that it is not), 'passing' may operate as an environmental factor which determines, in part, the I.Q. differences between the races.
The significance of this phenomenon is, in all likelihood, on the decline. In recent years, the black power movement, by stressing that 'black is beautiful', has probably tended to abate the tide of emigration of some of the most talented black men and women from the ghettos and from the so-called Negro race.
vm
I come now to the ideological character of the geneticist doctrine. I have explained why none of the major arguments in its defence bears close analysis, yet both Jensen and Eysenck claim to have been unwillingly forced, by the weight of evidence, to accept what they clearly recognized as an uncongenial conclusion. Their plea in mitigation is that the confession was extracted under the duress of their hard-headed and rational super-egos. Eysenck 'found it very difficult to look at the evidence ... with a detached mind, in view of the fact that it contradicted certain egalitarian beliefs [he] had considered almost axiomatic' (p. 12), and Jensen had similar difficulties.
It is, of course, hard-headed and rational to accept unpleasant or repugnant facts when theory and empirical evidence back them up. It is neither hard-headed nor rational, however, to cling on to repugnant doctrines merely because they are repugnant; that is simply intellectual masochism. And if there are powerful and reactionary interest-groups which will use the scientific endorsement of such doctrines for their own sinister purposes, then it is even worse: the scientists involved are then in danger of becoming accessories to crimes against humanity. I have outlined elsewhere (Colman, 1972) some of the reactionary uses to which the doctrines of 'scientific' racism have been put.
Less than two years before the publication of his controversial endorsement of the geneticist doctrine, Jensen wrote an article putting forward many of his later views, including the calculation ofthe heritability quotient. The whole emphasis of the article was, however, on the cultural disadvantage suffered by black Americans. Vernon (1970) has drawn attention to the disparity between the two pronouncements: in the earlier article Jensen came to the conclusion that, 'since we know that the Negro popUlation for the most part has suffered socio-economic and cultural disadvantages for :generations past, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that their low 150 RACE average IQ is due to environmental rather than genetic factors' (vide Vernon, 1970, pp. 161-2) .
Yet a mere 14 months later, he writes of 'various lines of evidence, no one of which is definitive alone, but which, viewed all together, make it a not unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-white intelligence difference' (Jensen, 1969a, p. 82) .
How did Jensen achieve this volte-face? According to Lee Cronbach, whom Jensen (1969b) has described as 'our most eminent educational psychologist' (p. 450), it was purchased at the cost of 'substantial distortions' in Jensen's reporting of research in the later article. Cronbach (1969) added: 'I must therefore warn the reader against accepting his summaries' (p. 344). A one-time co-author of Jensen's, Martin Deutsch (1969) , has cited numerous specific examples of these distortions. Deutsch remarked that a colleague of his, on a casual perusal of the article, detected seventeen errors (like, for instance, a 68 per cent becoming 86 per cent) and it is noteworthy that every single one of them favoured the genetic hypothesis.
Eysenck, for his part, adopted a modestly tentative stance on the genetic hypothesis in the introduction to his book, and he rightly castigated those who 'seem to know all the answers' (p. 7). Later on in the book, however, his timidity lifts like a veil to reveal the nakedly doctrinaire nature of his views. I have already quoted (in Section IV above) his extraordinary pronouncements on compensatory education, which illustrate this most vividly. One further example is, however, worth quoting. It is taken from Eysenck's discussion of possible selective factors, in the genetic sense, which could account for the inferior I.Q. scores of American blacks. Overlooking the more plausible continuous processes such as passing for white, he speculated that tribal chiefs in Africa might have chosen their less intelligent followers to sell to the slavers, and that the brighter ones might have had the resourcefulness to escape capture, or once captured might have had to be killed because they were too 'uppity' or because they tried to break out of captivity. 'The inevitable outcome of such selection', Eysenck concluded, 'would of course be the creation of a gene pool lacking some of the genes making for high intelligence ' (p. 47) . Notice the use of the phrase 'inevitable outcome' and 'of course'. The conclusion rests, in fact, on several unstated basic premises, not the least of which is one of the controversial propositions which his book sought to establish, namely that intellectual differences among people are overwhelmingly determined by genetic factors. Apart from being dogmatic, assuming the validity of one of the hypotheses one is attempting to prove is an example of the logical fallacy of petitio principii.
Still on the subject of the ideological character of the geneticist doctrine, I must say a few words on its practical implications. On the one hand, what social and educational policies do its adherents advocate? And on the other, what policies should they advocate, given their beliefs?
One implicit suggestion which does not follow logically from the geneticist doctrine, but which does have interesting political undertones, is that universities should extend the use of I.Q. tests for selecting students. Eysenck has written that, for various reasons, 'LSE refused to have any truck with IQ tests, and continued the demonstrably useless interviewing procedure; perhaps the troubles which ensued with their students are not unrelated to this decision!' (p. 61).
A more serious suggestion was advanced by Eysenck in Black Paper Two: the abandonment of compensatory education for the disadvantaged: 'When the evidence from American studies is as clearly negative as seems to be the case, then only political prejudice outweighing all contrary evidence can persist in calling for expenditure of large sums of money on what must at present be regarded as a lost cause' (vide Cox and Dyson, 1969) .
The stress is on the 'large sums of money' rather than on the 'clearly negative' evidence, for in his book, Eysenck admitted that 'the failure of those (compensatory) programmes should not be interpreted to mean that better projects could not be designed ' (p. 133) . He went even further by discussing one apparently successful project (Rick Heber's Milwaukee study, discussed above in Section IV), but concluded that, 'such environmental manipulation, even if it should prove successful, cannot of course be the answer; the cost is staggering, amounting to something like a million dollars a year, for just a hundred or so children' (p. 134; italics added). The ideological implications of this type of objection assume an ugly tinge when we bring to mind the billions of dollars of public money spent in the United States on such futilities as putting men on the moon, and most monstrously, on megadeath.
If the geneticist doctrine were true, that is to say if there really had accumulated a gene pool of low intelligence among black Americans (and perhaps also among the Irish, as Eysenck suggested), then there would be only two methods of dissipating it. The first and most obvious method would be by launching a social campaign to encourage miscegenation. The fact that this solution, logical though it is, has never been advocated by Jensen, Eysenck, or any previous adherent to the geneticist doctrine, says a great deal about the elitist and exclusive ideological character of that doctrine.
The only other method of solving the problem would be the method advocated by the Oxford historian, Edward Freeman, during a lecture tour of the United States less than a century ago: 'The best remedy for whatever is amiss in America would be if every Irishman should kill a Negro and be hanged for it ' (Vide Marshall, 1968, p. 159) .
In conclusion, a word of explanation is necessary for the use of the phrase 'scientific racism' in the title of this paper. I do not for one moment believe that Jensen and Eysenck, like so many previous adherents to the geneticist doctrine, are racists in the crude sense of viewing American blacks with hatred or wishing to oppress them. Eysenck, for example, is anxious to explain that such sentiments do not necessarily flow from his 'scientific' beliefs: I am not a racist for believing it possible that negroes may have special innate gifts for certain athletic events, such as sprints, or for certain musical forms of expression .... Nor am I a racist for seriously considering the possibility that the demonstrated inferiority of American negroes on tests of intelligence may, in part, be due to genetic causes (p. 11).
Despite a few squeals from the ideological bagpipe in this quotation, and in similar passages in Jensen's paper, there has clearly been a considerable retreat from the fully-orchestrated ideologies of previous generations of 'scientific' racists. I nevertheless feel fully justified in applying the term 'scientific' racism to their writings, because they contain pseudo-scientific dogmas which can be used, and have been used, to legitimate racially oppressive policies, notably in South Africa, and to perpetuate dangerous prejudices elsewhere; they are therefore racist in their social consequences, whatever the motives of their perpetrators.
